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Abstract 
Since the 2008 crisis, the liquidity of collateral has become a serious concern for financial market 
institutions and regulators due to its increased importance in risk and cash flow management. 
Surprisingly, market participants mobilise old-fashioned economic theory, such as Irving Fisher’s 
quantity theory of money in their discussions of how to deal with the new problems of collateral 
liquidity. Today, ‘collateral is the new cash’, as one sector report claims, marking a shift from a 
quantity theory of money to one of collateral. Liquidity, I argue, poses not only practical problems to 
market participants and regulators, but also epistemic ones. Accordingly, practitioners not only 
produce practical but also theoretical responses to it, mobilizing classical economic theory in so 
doing.  The problem of liquidity is shown to relate closely to a problem of ‘sovereignty’ in the narrow 
sense of guaranteeing the safe value of collateral. Contrary to established conceptions, sovereignty in 
this sense is not limited to states, but can also occur with monopolistic agents in the market such as 
global custodians. Thus, following the recent decade of crisis, general epistemic problems of liquidity 
and sovereignty in contemporary finance become visible through the practical problems and solutions 
in relation to collateral – specifically in the practical problems of buttressing liquidity in its double 
nature of collateral velocity and quality or safety.  
 
Keywords: Financial markets, liquidity, collateral, economic theory, European Union, Target2 
Securities (T2S) 
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1. Introduction 
With ongoing globalization and a surge in regulation following the 2008 financial crisis, 
collateralization – whereby security is pledged against a loan as a guarantee for the creditor in case 
of default – has assumed an increasingly important role, not only in financial market risk 
management, but also for government debt management and debt flows in financial markets (Braun 
and Hübner, 2018; Engelen and Glasmacher, 2018; Gabor, 2016; Gabor and Vestergaard, 2018; see 
Preunkert, 2017; Riles, 2011; Sweeney, 2017). In particular, the surge in the use of instruments such 
as ‘repo lending’ (collateralized borrowing through which banks manage liquidity) and derivatives 
(which are now generally subject to high collateral requirements in order to reduce systemic risk) has 
produced an increased focus on collateral and its role in financial markets (Gabor, 2016; Riles, 2010, 
2011). While researchers have invested greatly in understanding these developments, less attention 
has been paid to how they also face financial practitioners with epistemic uncertainties that require 
new reflection and new responses. Both market agents and regulators have begun to discuss issues 
related to the quantity and liquidity of the eligible collateral available in the market (Clearstream and 
PWC, 2013; Fender and Lewrick, 2013; ICMA, 2012; ICMA-ERC, 2014; Singh, 2013, 2015). The 
European Commission’s (2015) recent Green Paper on a ‘Capital Markets Union’ bears clear traces 
of this debate (see also Braun and Hübner, 2018; Engelen and Glasmacher, 2018). Examining these 
discussions, the article shows that, puzzlingly, monetarist ‘quantity theory’ – a macroeconomic theory 
otherwise abandoned by academic economists and central bankers alike – has re-emerged in financial 
market practice, not in relation to monetary creation, but rather to collateral, its creation and its 
circulation. The article asks why and how this theory has re-emerged within financial markets since 
2008 and argues that it responds to the new role of collateral in assuring liquidity in financial markets. 
The closer analysis leads to the identification of clear traces of further economic theories in 
contemporary financial practice – notably Keynesian and modern finance theories. Yet, where 
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existing approaches to the epistemic role of economic theories in markets have thought of theories as 
either coherent, instrumental, and/or socio-technologically developing entities, the present article 
emphasises the co-existence of different and even contradicting theories in relation to a common 
problem (see also Krarup, 2019a, 2019b). For example, Seabrooke and Tsingou (2014) focus on how 
different expert groups promote different policy ideas based on their distinct professional knowledge 
in relation to financial regulation; with her concept of epistemic culture, Knorr-Cetina (1999: 9) 
focused on the ‘machineries of knowing’ as the important feature tying together a knowledge domain; 
MacKenzie (2006) and Callon (1998) have focused on the performative effects of specific economic 
theories in constructing markets in their image; Mirowski (2009) has thought of neoliberalism as a 
‘thought collective’ more or less loosely organized around a number of main tenets. But the analysis 
here will have a somewhat different focus: how a certain problem of economic theory – across its 
different specific variants as a more or less stable palette of responses to that problem – continues to 
re-emerge in contemporary finance, namely the problem of liquidity. In other words, it is the common 
determination of an epistemic problem, not the specific responses (theories) that are the main focus 
here. 
The problem of liquidity in financial markets occurs because the asset that guarantees liquidity 
– money, collateral – must simultaneously be scarce and restricted by quality concerns in order to 
guarantee safe value. In other words, liquidity is Janus-faced, as it relies on a commodity of a fixed 
quantity (money, collateral), but at the same time on infinite availability (credit, repo). In the quantity 
theory terminology, ‘liquidity’ is not only the ‘velocity’ of a scarce asset in market transactions here 
and now, but also the ‘security’ or guarantee that the asset can always be sold in the market at a stable 
price in the future. Liquidity is a paradox, ideally demanding the infinite exchangeability of a finite 
quantity of assets – but a necessary paradox to economic theory in academia and financial practice 
alike. Monetarist theory has re-emerged in relation to collateral, I argue, because a number of 
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developments have pushed towards the scarce-commodity pole of this contradiction since 2008, 
following the seemingly ever-expanding credit and liquidity during the prior two decades of the ‘great 
moderation’ in business cycle volatility (see Braun, 2014). But the transposition of quantity theory 
from money to collateral also reveals its close relation to problems of risk and what I term 
‘sovereignty’ understood as the capacity to guarantee liquidity within a more or less closed market 
space. Economic theory may be of help here, but not as individual theories, I argue. Economic theory 
is founded on an epistemic commitment of non-contradiction. As a consequence, the contradictions 
of liquidity are reflected in the opposition between different and even opposing economic theories, 
each conceptualizing different aspects of liquidity. This, I argue, is why old quantity theory can re-
emerge despite its well-known fallacies: It helps account for and deal with one aspect of liquidity that 
has become increasingly pressing since 2008. 
Given that collateral in contemporary finance is itself a credit instrument (bond) pledged as a 
guarantee against another credit instrument, both of which are traded as ‘commodities’ in the market, 
we may accentuate this contradiction as follows: as security, collateral must be a perfectly liquid, 
stably-priced, and riskless credit commodity, while as a credit commodity, collateral must be scarce, 
price-fluctuating according to supply and demand, and remunerated according to its risk profile. 
Liquidity, I argue, is the concept supposed to mediate between the two. This relates to the new ways 
that state and market interlace around the concept of collateral in contemporary finance. Liquidity 
requires what I call a ‘sovereign’ agent, not entirely synonymous with the state, to provide the 
liquidity guarantee, being simultaneously a player in the market and setting the framework of the 
market. Quasi-monopolistic global custodian banks are examples of non-state ‘sovereign’ agents in 
this sense. In this way, the problem of liquidity is traced across the concepts of money, collateral, 
risk, and sovereignty.  
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In the article, I deliberately leave out of consideration the strategic and political power struggles 
within which the problem of collateral liquidity has emerged and quantity theory resurrected. Indeed, 
the main actors here are powerful lobby organizations, international banks, and European government 
bodies – all of which are engaged in a number of major projects and negotiations around continued 
European financial market integration (Krarup, 2019a). These power struggles are the main focus of 
the majority of contributions to the political economy of contemporary finance. By contrast, the focus 
on epistemic problems in the present article is in all modesty new and merits thorough treatment. 
Certainly, the lobby organizations of international banks have an interest in promoting arguments in 
favour of more lax regulation of capital and the European Commission can turn the same arguments 
in favour of renewed market integration efforts. But we would still want to know what problems these 
political struggles are structured by and how. Crucially, these structures will most likely tell us 
nothing about who wins in the political struggles (questions of power), but they may illuminate the 
playing field and the rules of the game when it comes to making knowledge claims and expertise 
arguments in those struggles (epistemic questions).  
The research materials mobilized in the article are drawn from a bigger research project on 
European financial market integration (Krarup, 2019a) and focused on – but not restricted to – a major 
project by the European Central Bank (ECB) to create a new pan-European infrastructure for financial 
markets called Target2 Securities (T2S). One of the qualities ofT2S mentioned by a number of 
interviewees and documents was its effects on ‘collateral fluidity’, which is the focus of the article. 
The research materials comprise three sources related to T2S. First, 59 interviews conducted mainly 
in 2014–2015 in France, Germany, Denmark and Belgium with 72 persons from European central 
banks, financial infrastructure providers, private banks and regulatory authorities, including the ECB 
and the European Commission. Second, sector reports, legislation and other documents. Finally, 
selected classics of economic theory, which were consulted in order to further explore and analyse 
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the apparent economic character of discussions, were identified in the first two materials. In 
particular, for the purposes of the analysis presented in this article, a number of classic theories of 
money and finance were consulted, including monetarist, Keynesian and post-Keynesian, financial, 
neoclassical and Austrian theories. 
The following section provides more detailed background information about collateral and 
quantity theory. The third section accounts for the recent formation of a collateral problem in finance. 
The fourth section examines the slogan that ‘collateral is the new cash’ and the quantity theory behind 
it. The fifth section identifies the paradoxical need for a ‘sovereign’ to guarantee liquidity in 
contemporary finance. The sixth section discusses the analysis in light of economic theory and 
modern finance theory. The final section concludes and discusses perspectives for a new research 
agenda on the role of economic theory in contemporary finance. 
 
2. The Background: What is Collateral and What is Quantity Theory? 
Simply put, collateral is security placed by debtors with creditors as a guarantee on a loan: if the 
debtor defaults the creditor obtains ownership of the collateral. Since the financial crisis, regulators 
have strongly increased requirements for collateral use as a means to enhance systemic stability in 
financial markets.1 However, collateral poses a problem to the extent that it makes financial assets 
‘lie dead’, potentially impinging on efficiency, liquidity and credit creation. Market participants and 
others have also raised concerns about ‘the quantity of collateral’ – whether enough high-quality 
collateral is available in markets to meet regulatory demands and to ensure market liquidity (credit 
creation) (Clearstream and PWC, 2013; European Commission, 2015; Fender and Lewrick, 2013; 
ICMA, 2012; ICMA-ERC, 2014; Singh, 2013, 2015). At the same time, new market infrastructure 
technologies allowing collateral to be re-used and exchanged more freely have given rise to the idea 
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that ‘collateral is the new cash’ (ICMA-ERC, 2014). As the analysis will show, it is within this context 
that the monetarist quantity theory has risen again, albeit in a new guise.  
Quantity theory builds on the idea of a simple relationship between the aggregates of quantity, 
velocity (or liquidity, fluidity), price and transaction volumes of the most liquid asset (money). Based 
on the famous monetarist formula MV=PT, the quantity theory of money of Irving Fisher and later 
Milton Friedman stipulates a direct long-run causal impact of the money supply M on the price level 
P (‘inflation’) because the transaction volumes T and the velocity of money V (the aggregate number 
of times a money asset ‘changes hands’ within a given period of time) are assumed to be stable. Not 
only did the theory become influential among academic economists in the 1970s, it was also for some 
time the official policy of a number of major central banks in the world, but has since gone out of 
fashion again, at least in its pure form. In the 1990s and 2000s the hitherto stable aggregate 
relationship between M and P seemed to have disappeared (Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 
2008). It has been questioned whether central bankers actually ever believed in the theory or rather 
used it as a rhetorical device to legitimize their policies (Braun, 2016). Even at the heyday of 
monetarism – during the ‘Volcker shock’ imposed by the Chairman of the Federal Reserve in 1979 – 
monetary policy seems to not have been guided by money-supply targeting (Krippner, 2012: 121). 
More recently, the Bank of England (2014) has explained publicly that it does not control inflation 
and interest rates by setting the quantity of money, M. Banks create money when they make loans, 
while central banks ease access to reserves when liquidity needs in markets push interest rates away 
from the policy level. As one central banker explained to me, this means that central banks passively 
adjust M to the liquidity demand of banks on a continuous basis in order to manipulate the interest 
rate towards the policy level. Credit was allowed to expand and new credit instruments to proliferate 
as long as consumer price inflation remained (or appeared to be) under control during the ‘great 
moderation’ in the 2000s because financial markets were said to efficiently align the risk and price 
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of assets (Braun, 2015). Some have argued that the paradigm that has replaced monetarism – ‘new 
Keynesian economics’ – is in fact permeated by fundamental monetarist tenets, even if only ‘a few 
eddies’ today are declared monetarists (de Long, 2000). Rhetorical or substantial, the going out of 
fashion of quantity theory has been clear. 
 
3. The Materials and their Treatment 
The materials are drawn from a bigger research project on European financial market integration 
(Krarup, 2019a), focused on – but not restricted to – a major project by the European Central Bank 
(ECB) to create a new pan-European infrastructure for financial markets called Target2 Securities 
(T2S). One of the qualities of T2S mentioned by a number of interviewees and documents was its 
effects on ‘collateral fluidity’, which is the focus of the article.  
The materials gathered for the research project comprises three sources related to T2S. Firstly, 
59 interviews conducted mainly in 2014-2015 in France, Germany, Denmark, and Belgium with 72 
persons from European central banks, financial infrastructure providers, private banks, and regulatory 
authorities, including the European Central Bank (ECB) and the European Commission. Secondly, 
sector reports, legislation, and other documents. Finally, selected classics of economic theory, which 
were consulted in order to further explore and analyse the apparent economic character of discussions 
identified in the first two materials. In particular, for the purposes of the analysis presented in this 
article, a number of classic theories of money and finance were consulted, including monetarist, 
Keynesian and post-Keynesian, financial, neoclassical, and Austrian theories. 
 
4. The Formation of a Collateral Problem in Finance 
In order to guarantee anything, collateral must be ‘safe’ assets. ‘High-quality liquid’ and ‘high 
quality’ assets in the nomenclature of the Basel III regulation perform the collateral function for 
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virtually the entire market (ICMA-ERC, 2014). These are generally government bonds, since stocks 
are more price volatile and commercial bonds more risky. Moreover, the ‘haircuts’ that collateral 
takers apply in order to protect themselves against price volatility easily go through the roof for assets 
that have not received top credit rating, while important collateral takers, such as central banks, flatly 
deny accepting them altogether.2  
But the ‘safety’ function of collateral means that corrections must be performed throughout the 
life-time of the credit obligation depending on fluctuations in the value and risk profile of the 
collateralized asset in the market. The so-called mark-to-market standard means that, on a frequent 
basis and depending on the direction of price changes in the asset, the debtor will receive collateral 
back or be called to pledge more collateral. The valuation of collateral reveals its inherent 
contradictions. Riles (2010: 800) observes that the concept of collateral rests on a fiction because it 
has one leg in perfectly efficient markets and another leg in a market structure of qualitative 
differences and arbitrage possibilities.  Millo et al. (2005) likewise observe that collateral serves two 
contradictory functions: it must be an intrinsically valuable asset that can secure a ‘bureaucratic’ 
realm of settlement from market risks, while it must constantly be valued in the market. The problem 
of valuation is due to the double role of collateral as being, at once, security against market risk and 
as commodity that can at any time be sold in the market. 
The traditional collateralisation technique is the ‘pledge’ where an asset in the debtor’s portfolio 
is flagged so that it cannot be sold but legally remains the possession of the debtor. Today, by contrast, 
collateral in the short-term liquidity management of big, highly leveraged financial institutions is 
‘repos’. Repo is an abbreviation of ‘repurchase agreement,’ meaning that the collateralised loan is in 
fact legally a sale of securities with an obligation to buy them back at a future date at a pre-set price 
(calculated as an interest rate). This means that the collateral can be sold on to a third party or used 
as collateral by the creditor in the meantime – the only obligation is to deliver back equivalent 
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collateral when the loan is redeemed. This is called collateral re-use or rehypothecation. Repos are 
also used by many central banks in their monetary policy and since the 1990s the use of repos in 
markets has been facilitated by technical innovations, Basel regulation, and ICMA harmonisation, 
while repos have also increased in popularity as a way to circumvent capital requirements and other 
regulation related to traditional loans with pledged collateral (see Garbade, 2006; ICMA, 2011; Riles, 
2011: 170).  
Collateral re-use became infamous during the financial crisis because defaults, downgrades, and 
plunging asset prices inflicted chaos in the long and intransparent chains of bilateral collateral 
obligations. The repo system has been characterized as pro-cyclical and criticized as one of the causes 
of the 2008 financial crisis: When security prices fall due to a chock in the market, pressure increases 
on financial institutions to meet their collateral obligations in the short-term repo funding market, 
leading to fire-sales that further contribute to price falls (Gabor, 2016; Gorton and Metrick, 2012; 
Mehrling et al., 2015; Pozsar et al., 2013; Stein, 2015). In other words, even if financial institutions 
could still sell their collateral assets and hence uphold their simple ‘velocity’ (V), plunging prizes (P) 
would still undermine their function as security and hence their ‘liquidity’. Yet, collateral continues 
to be promoted by regulation and serves in relation to all kinds of outstanding obligations – manifest 
or potential. Besides repos, it is used notably in derivatives contracts, such as interest-rate or foreign-
exchange swaps. It is a ‘core element of private market self-regulation’ (Riles, 2011: 159) as well as 
for monetary policy implementation and in ensuring that central banks do not take any ‘market risk’.  
Before the financial crisis of 2008, overnight and short-term lending between banks to a larger 
extent took place in the ‘money market’ on a ‘blanco’ basis – that is, with no collateral as security 
against the credit. However, during the financial crisis the unsecured money market ‘froze up’ and 
has hardly recovered since. An ECB economist reports that in 2012 ‘about 80% of short-term 
interbank lending was secured compared to 60-65% in 2007’ (Terol, 2013: 9). European banks in 
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particular still do not trust each others as debtors, so collateral serves as a guarantor. One sector report 
therefore states that ‘collateral management has become inseparable from liquidity management and 
risk management. In the modern financial and economic context, these are essentially the same thing’ 
(ICMA-ERC, 2014: 5). 
The optimisation of collateral management has become important for the individual financial 
institution, while for the financial market as a whole the supply and liquidity of collateral has become 
an issue of concern. With rising regulatory requirements and the prevalence of the ‘austerity’ view 
that governments should reduce their debt burden (hence removing high-quality collateral from 
markets), market agents have begun raising questions such as the following: Will there be collateral 
shortages in the future? Can more optimised collateral use contribute to the prevention of shortages 
and reduce costs? How will market stress and crisis affect the price and liquidity of collateral? 
(Clearstream and PWC, 2013; European Commission, 2015; Fender and Lewrick, 2013; ICMA, 
2012; ICMA-ERC, 2014; Singh, 2013, 2015). It is within this context that quantity theory has re-
emerged.  
 
5. ‘Collateral is the New Cash’ 
The ECB’s implementation of T2S – a new pan-European financial infrastructure – between 2015 
and 2017 has attracted the attention of the sector. According to the European Commission (2015: 22–
23), T2S is an essential prerequisite to the ongoing projects for renewed financial market integration 
(see Epstein and Rhodes, 2018). T2S will ideally allow banks to pool their European settlement 
accounts for securities transactions, putting an end to the previous fragmentation amongst 20+ 
national and regional settlement systems with each its liquidity buffer and legal framework. In this 
context, the custody industry has begun to explore new business opportunities (see Clearstream and 
PWC, 2013).  
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Global and regional custodian banks like Bank of New York Mellon, JP Morgan, BNP Paribas 
and Société Générale, along with two so-called international central securities depositories (ICSDs), 
Euroclear and Clearstream, provide services related to the settlement of financial transactions such 
as credit, collateral management, and securities lending. These services facilitate the smooth 
settlement of huge amounts of diverse transactions across different technical systems and national 
legal environments, optimising cash and collateral use (see ECB, 2007). While originally conceived 
to integrate the settlement of financial transactions in Europe, it is now realized that T2S may also 
make financial markets more liquid because it facilitates, harmonises, and optimises the process 
whereby securities as collateral can be turned into cash and vice versa. As one central banker puts it: 
‘If you see the liquidity of banks as a person running on two legs, a cash and a securities leg,’ then 
the asymmetry in Europe before T2S between integrated central banking and payment systems, on 
the one hand, and fragmented settlement infrastructures, on the other hand, meant that ‘the one leg 
[cash] can go at full speed and the other one [securities] can merely walk.’  
The bipedal image of liquidity in the central banker’s account is telling of its conceptual 
ambiguity: ‘Liquidity’ is often used synonymously with cash, but can also be broader and designate 
the marketability and collateralisability of any financial asset in return for cash. As implied by the 
central banker, while ‘liquidity’ is certainly ‘one person’, so to speak, it has ‘two legs’ – and they 
must move in perfect cadence for liquidity to run fast. The keyword here is exchangeability between 
assets. But exchangeability, too, has two sides: the capacity to engage in transactions at all times and 
the stability of valuation of the assets in those transactions (when prices plunge, as in 2008, liquidity 
has ‘dried up’ because even if the assets could still be sold it would no longer enable banks to meet 
their credit obligations). Indeed, while market participants often speak of the liquidity of a single 
asset, the underlying problem is liquidity as a stable relationship of fungibility between money and 
other financial assets.  
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Conforming to the image of liquidity as walking on the two legs of cash and collateral and with 
the auspicious prospects of T2S, one sector report published by the International Capital Market 
Association (ICMA) and the European Repo Council (ERC) contends that ‘Collateral is the New 
Cash’ (ICMA-ERC, 2014). With T2S, money and collateral in Europe is said to become extremely 
fungible, even cross-border, while collateral can be mobilised from anywhere in Europe to access 
central bank or private bank credit (see also Clearstream and PWC, 2013).  
 
5.1. The Fluidity of Collateral and the Resurrection of Quantity Theory 
To be sure, velocity and liquidity are not one and the same concept. Velocity does not contain the 
same contradictions as liquidity does, but can be calculated as a simple average. Yet, velocity makes 
up one side in the contradictory concept of liquidity, the other side being safe value or value 
guarantee, as we shall see in more detail in section 6. The tricky thing here is that practitioners 
sometimes use ‘liquidity’ to denote only one side of the contradiction, that is, as synonymous with 
velocity. To make matters even more confusing, market participants today often speak of the ‘fluidity’ 
of collateral – sometimes synonymous with velocity, sometimes with liquidity.  In more technical 
contexts, the underlying concept, however, is clearly the same as velocity, as it refers to the average 
number of times an aggregate quantity of securities is used as collateral within a given period of time. 
The term ‘fluidity’ was used by several interviewees and can be found in the European Commission’s 
recent green paper on ‘Capital Markets Union’ (European Commission, 2015: 23). The term is most 
likely inspired by another ICMA report entitled ‘Collateral Fluidity,’ which contends that ‘it is widely 
perceived that demands for high-quality collateral will significantly outstrip supply’ in the future, and 
that therefore ‘it is essential that efforts be made to ensure that collateral is able to flow as efficiently 
as possible’ (ICMA, 2012: 1). The ‘Collateral is the New Cash’ report adds that both the supply and 
the fluidity of collateral becomes particularly important in times of market stress or crisis ‘when 
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demand-supply imbalances are likely to be accentuated’ (ICMA-ERC, 2014: 10). According to this 
report, ‘equilibrium’ between supply and demand for collateral can be represented by paraphrasing 
the central formula of quantity theory (section 2): 
 
Demand for collateral = Effective supply of collateral x Collateral fluidity (ICMA-ERC, 
2014: 10).3 
 
The equation is inspired by International Monetary Fund (IMF) economist Mammohan Singh (2013, 
see also 2015), who assesses trends in the ‘velocity’ or ‘re-use’ of collateral. Note how the equation 
corresponds to Irving Fisher’s (2009) ‘quantity theory of money,’ according to which MV=PT. On 
the left-hand side of the Fisher equation, the availability of money can be decomposed into the supply 
of a given quantity of money M multiplied by its velocity (the number of times it is re-used in a given 
time period) V; on the right-hand side, the use of money can be decomposed into the demand to settle 
a given number of transactions T and the average price per transaction P.  Now re-consider the 
collateral equation above: The right-hand side is clearly equivalent to Fisher’s quantity of money M 
multiplied by the velocity of money in circulation V, while the left-hand side could easily be 
decomposed into factors corresponding to Fisher’s number of transactions T and average price level 
P.4 We may, therefore, refer to the equation as the ‘quantity theory of collateral.’ 
While the Fisher equation in itself in both cases is said to be nothing but a tautology, it has served 
as support for two kinds of theories about the causal relationship: 1) mainly from  MV to PT because 
the quantity of money and economic activity are seen as relatively stable (‘exogenous money’ in 
monetarist theory) or from PT to MV because money is constantly created and destroyed as credit in 
response to transaction needs (‘endogenous money’ in post-Keynesian theory). Likewise, there is no 
causal relationship implied by the quantity of collateral equation in itself. Yet, the concern is clearly 
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with how scarcity of high-quality collateral makes increasing collateral fluidity the only plausible 
way out of liquidity pressures – encompassing both velocity and security. If collateral fluidity does 
not go up, collateral demands may not be met in the future, or so the report suggests. In other words, 
the number of financial transactions will decrease, a decline in credit creation will follow and, 
possibly, economic activity eventually stagnate. While ICMA seems most concerned with the first 
steps, the European Commission seems to be concerned with the latter consequences, which is also 
officially the reason why it strongly pushes its capital market integration agenda more broadly 
(European Commission, 2015). As we shall see in section 6, the political concern for financial 
liquidity is not new, but the concern specifically with collateral liquidity in terms of quantity theory 
is. In other words, the quantity theory of collateral does imply more than a tautological equation, 
namely a set of causal relationships. There thus appears to be a parallel between the problems around 
the concept of money in economic theory and that of collateral in contemporary finance. Where 
monetarism was concerned with inflation due to extensive central bank credit creation, the quantity 
theory of collateral so far is concerned with the ‘deflationary’ pressures on collateral due to clotting 
of collateral fluidity and supply-demand imbalances. But the two subscribe to homologous 
conceptualizations of the problem of liquidity.  
Rather than simply embracing the slogan that ‘collateral is the new cash’ as an adequate 
description of contemporary finance, I ask what has made the slogan emerge and how it is related to 
outdated economic theories. It is important to note that quantity theory is not about the quantity of 
money or collateral in itself, but the quantity in relation to its velocity or, more profoundly, its 
liquidity. Traditionally, economic theory describes money as a ‘medium of exchange.’ In economic 
theory, money is the most ‘marketable’ commodity and therefore takes on a new and special use 
value: its liquidity, that is, its capacity to buy. This means that upholding the liquidity and stable value 
of the money commodity becomes a prerequisite for efficient markets. As we have seen, collateral 
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can facilitate this because it secures debtors against default risk and thus eases credit-money creation. 
But to serve this purpose and to be universally transformable into money, collateral has to be as liquid 
and stable as money itself – that is, it, too, must be perfectly fungible and liquid. The interest of T2S 
as a market infrastructure is that it contributes precisely to that end. But the problem of liquidity 
extends far beyond T2S in contemporary finance.  
 
5.2. The Beauty of Perfect Liquidity is that Nothing Moves 
Having identified and unravelled the explicit manifestation of a quantity theory of collateral in 
contemporary finance, it is possible to follow it into areas where it has not been made explicit but is 
nonetheless latently identifiable in epistemic practices. Specifically, we may follow the need for 
collateral liquidity to other institutions and technologies that actually produce liquidity like the 
engines of modern finance and the innovations made around them, other than T2S. As mentioned in 
section 4, collateral re-use was heavily criticized in the wake of the financial crisis. ‘There have been 
debates about stopping re-use completely,’ one infrastructure provider explained to me. This is 
interesting because re-use is exactly what gives collateral its double character as both a liquid 
‘commodity’ and a safeguard ‘security,’ and allows it to bridge between securities and cash. In fact, 
the ‘fluidity’ of collateral discussed in the previous section is defined precisely the extent of collateral 
re-use (ICMA-ERC, 2014: 10n). 
According to some, the problem of intransparent chains concerns only bilateral repos. There is 
one alternative to the anonymous rehypothecation chains of bilateral ‘over-the-counter’ repos, which 
appears to overcome this immediate contradiction. In ‘tri-party’ repos, a major depository institution 
– in particular two global custodian banks (JP Morgan Chase, Bank of New York Mellon), two ICSDs 
(Euroclear and Clearstream), and some of the big national CSDs (see Duffie, 2015) – facilitate, 
oversee and manage the re-use of repos within their own accounting environments. In the tri-party 
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setup, both the taker and giver of collateral are clients with the depositary institution and both have 
securities and cash accounts with it. This means that chains of re-use are transparent to the provider, 
who can help unlock them if necessary and provide collateral management services, such as collateral 
substitution and lending, that further facilitates liquidity within the ‘closed room’ it offers. One 
triparty provider explains: 
 
If you think about collateral services being this room [in which the interview is taking place] 
at a certain point a piece of collateral comes in through this door and the door is closed. Then 
it may go from one collateral provider to a receiver, to another receiver etc., but all in this 
room, and it can never leave out the door unless it goes back to the original provider. That is 
kind of the re-use concept that we apply and which we can also apply across [our partners] 
because it is within one logic. So [the collateral] could go to Australia, but it is still considered 
to be in the same room, you are still in a closed system.  
 
Similarly, in a more succinct formulation ending a long account of a triparty system, a former 
executive from a global custodian bank exclaimed: ‘The beauty of the system is that you just do debit 
and credit between accounts on your platform. Nothing moves!’ 
The contradiction between collateral as security and as cash (i.e., as appearing on both sides of 
the quantity equation) thus appears to be overcome, as the liquidity turns absolute, unbound – a perfect 
‘medium’ of exchange. However, upon closer inspection, the contradiction is rather transposed to 
another level, since perfect transparency and liquidity is only provided on the condition of the 
centralisation, if not monopolisation of ‘the market’ as such. The custody industry is highly 
specialised and strongly centralised on a few global and regional institutions. As of 2006, the biggest 
three custodian banks in the world – JP Morgan, Bank of New York and State Street – together held 
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approximately $37 tn. worth of assets under custody – almost the same total amount as the next 12 
custodian banks, holding approximately $41 tn., the next 35 holding ‘only’ about $10 tn. in total 
(ECB, 2007: 14).  
A new problematic concept thus emerges – that of market structure. The global custodian banks 
offer insulated spaces of strongly buttressed liquidity, but are able to do so only in so far as they create 
and monopolize that market space. Global custodian banks and other tri-party providers profit from 
their privileged position as the nodal points of transactions between financial institutions. Some 
institutions, such as pension and investment funds, sit on piles of high-quality assets, while others, 
such as broker-dealers and investment banks, seek to reduce their inventories to an absolute 
minimum, often (‘short’) selling assets they do not even possess yet. The funds may be restrained by 
regulation from investing in lower-class assets, while the banks may have troubles delivering on time 
– so they can sign a securities lending agreement with the tri-party provider that kicks in automatically 
when needed.5 The global custodian, one interviewee explains, ‘maintains and maximises the 
collateral use across all these counterparties, computes haircuts, valuates, calls in extra collateral 
when needed, substitutes and transforms the collateral, etc. All this you have to do in real time. It is 
massive!’ The role of triparty providers as guarantors of liquidity through the production of 
fungibility between assets even goes as far as to define broad ‘baskets’ of collateral with specific risk 
profiles in which clients can trade instead of moving around specific assets. In the end, for collateral 
in its function as safety, ‘risk profile’ is all that matters. These baskets form the basis of extremely 
deep and liquid markets in collateral – more than the market in any one specific asset. Thus, via the 
concepts of liquidity and fungibility, within the closed space of the triparty system where ‘nothing 
moves’, financial assets (which are already debt instruments) are further abstracted into pure value 
and risk profiles. But, paradoxically, the removal of all frictions to liquidity and the perfect integration 
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of the market is itself a service provided in the market, not overcoming frictions to liquidity but 
transposing their structure.  
According to economic theory, market structures such as these are ‘monopolistic’ (or possibly 
‘natural monopolies’) due to the high ‘fixed costs’, ‘network effects’ and ‘economies of scale’ that 
just so happen to characterise financial custody and market infrastructures in general (Milne, 2007). 
But the analysis here suggests that the tension would not go away with a few path-breaking 
innovations in the sector, since it concerns more fundamentally the paradox that liquidity is not a 
predicate of single assets, but a relationship between different assets that must be procured via ‘market 
integration’, which is itself a service of centralisation and ultimately monopolisation, contradicting 
the competitive condition of efficiency that motivated it at the outset.6  
 
6. The ‘Sovereign’ of Liquidity  
The ‘sorting out’ of the repo networks by creating an integrated system is not the only difficulty 
addressed by the global custodians’ triparty systems. Indeed, I argue, they serve a kind of ‘sovereign’ 
function as well in securing the liquidity (in the double sense) of collateral – a role which resembles, 
at least in an abstract sense, the role of states as ‘sovereigns’ in financial markets. Traditionally, so-
called ‘sovereign’ bonds – that is, government debt – have been the primary source of high-quality 
safe assets used as collateral because it is generally unlikely that states default on their loans, at least 
that EU member states would do so. But in the wake of the financial crisis, some EU member states 
came under so much pressure that their status as debtors was downgraded by the major international 
credit rating agencies – Greek sovereign debt was even downgraded to ‘junk’, meaning that it was 
effectively useless as collateral, as not even European central banks were allowed to accept it.7 In 
other words, liquidity ‘dried up’ for security (not velocity) reasons, exposing the implicit state 
guarantee underlying the entire financial system and its potential flaws. What is less often noted is 
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that this guarantee is not founded on the mere credit status of states alone, as if they were market 
players like everybody else, but also concerns their role as regulators of the very markets that they 
themselves depend on for credit. Moreover, there is a certain way – even if only so in a very abstract 
sense – in which the frictionless space of perfect liquidity where ‘nothing moves’ created by the 
global custodian bank resonates with the role of the state in contemporary finance.  
Despite the well-known trends within recent decades that have moved in the opposite direction 
(separation of fiscal and monetary policy, withdrawal of government from many forms of economic 
activity and investment, deregulation of financial markets) new close state-market relationships have 
also emerged in finance (Braun and Hübner, 2018; Braunstein, 2017; Gabor and Ban, 2016). States 
are in a special position to remove risk from liquidity employing a number of techniques and 
regulations across the otherwise separate fields of collateral management and government debt (see 
also Gabor, 2016; Gabor and Ban, 2016). I refer to this capacity as ‘sovereignty’, not over a territory 
and a population, in this case, but over a market in which an agent is engaged, in particular with 
regards to ‘solving’ the intrinsic contradiction of liquidity. Removing risk from market exchange and 
buttressing liquidity is the imposition of a certain governance framework on bilateral exchanges that 
is not external to those exchanges as mere ‘intervention’ or ‘regulation’, but itself a part of them. It 
is necessary to think of sovereignty not exclusively in terms of the state, but rather as a liquidity-
guaranteeing force within markets, related to the ‘inherent hierarchy’ of money and finance 
(Mehrling, 2013). The parallel between the global custodian bank and the sovereign state is a 
conceptual one in so far as they both are not simply the providers of infrastructures and regulation, 
but at the same time the frame-condition for the establishment of efficient markets through the 
buttressing of liquidity and the guarantors against the manifestation of the intrinsic contradiction of 
liquidity.  
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From this perspective, it becomes important not only to appreciate the ‘sovereign’ aspects of 
certain major financial institutions such as global custodian banks, but also, reversely, to appreciate 
states as ‘sovereigns’ in the market. In section 4, I explained that government bonds – or ‘sovereign 
debt’ – is the predominant kind of asset to be used as ‘high-quality liquid’ collateral. In this section, 
we shall see that this is not simply due to governments being generally regarded as safe debtors. States 
are able to buttress the market liquidity of their debt in various ways that are not open to others, 
including regulation. These techniques contribute towards the status of government debt as both a 
strong guarantee of security and a highly liquid commodity. The state is a ‘sovereign’ standing with 
one leg in the market and one leg outside it, straddling the contradiction of collateral between security 
and commodity. One example is the ‘primary dealer’ system, discussed in detail in subsection 6.1.  
 
6.1. The primary dealer system and regulation as instances of state sovereignty 
The primary dealer system originally comes from the US. The French central bank embraced the 
primary dealer system with enthusiasm while the German central bank has been much more reluctant 
(Gabor, 2016). Officially, Germany does not have a primary dealer system, although central bankers 
I interviewed explained that there are many similarities. For example, while the Bundesbank’s 
sovereign debt auctions are in principle open to all banks, they require acceptance according to certain 
criteria and newly issued government bonds are only sold in portions of €1 m., that is, de facto to 
bigger institutions (cf. Deutsche Bundesbank, 2015). 
In general, to become a primary dealer, a bank must fulfil certain criteria – the main concern 
being its ability to assure the liquidity of the government bonds in the ‘secondary market’. Indeed, 
there is not one, but two markets in government debt: one in which a short list of big banks bid for 
the bonds as they are issued and one in which the bonds circulate between investors in what we 
usually understand as ‘the market.’ Both markets are governed so as to create and maintain liquidity 
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and to keep the price of borrowing (interest rates) low for the state. The primary dealers are thus 
‘market makers’ in government bonds in the secondary market. Their number varies: from about 10 
in Denmark, over about 20 in France, to about 30 in Germany (see AFME, 2015; see also Agence 
France Trésor, 2016; Deutsche Bundesbank, 2016; Nationalbanken, 2015). Many are international 
banks, often based in London (Gabor, 2016).  
In return for their privileged access, the primary dealer banks are contractually obliged to bid at 
all the auctions: ‘The Treasury is very keen on that all participants bid on all lines’, as one central 
banker explains. The primary dealers are monitored, their statute reviewed, and the list of institutions 
revised every year. The primary dealers are even obliged to bid within a specific price range and to 
have a permanent offer with low ‘spreads’ between their bid (buy) and ask (sell) prices. A Danish 
primary dealer explains: 
 
We have various obligations that are decided in dialogue with the issuers [the Treasury or 
central bank]. For instance, we agree to be active from 8 AM to 4 PM with a 10 øre [~1.5 
cent] bid-offer spread on certain platforms [i.e., secondary markets] to maintain a certain 
level of [price] information and liquidity [in the market]. Then we meet regularly with the 
other primary dealers and the issuers … to discuss whether everything works out, or if there 
are some things to be improved. 
 
The primary dealer system is first of all a way for governments to borrow cheaply. Since in financial 
markets price is very much a reflection of risk, what governments do with the primary dealer system 
is to create a framework that obliges certain major banks to keep buying and selling within a pre-set 
range of prices. They do so in an attempt to guarantee market liquidity even at moments when banks 
have no direct financial incentive to do so (their interest, the interviewee above explains, lies more in 
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the market position and client access that comes with being a primary dealer, than with direct revenues 
from being one). With market liquidity guaranteed, buyers of sovereign bonds in the secondary 
market know that they can at any time – even in times of market stress or crisis – sell or buy high 
quality collateral according to their liquidity needs without affecting prices too much. This guarantee, 
in turn, is one reason why governments can borrow at lower interest rates than most others. The 
primary dealer system, of course, is not the only factor contributing to this end, and it is far from 
perfect in guaranteeing market liquidity, as became clear with the credit downgrading of several EU 
member states following the financial crisis. Indeed, the fundamental point about liquidity is that it is 
a problem because it warrants a guarantee without being able to provide a perfect one, since that 
guarantee must be given in terms of the competitive valuation of scarce assets in a market. But the 
system is not passive to such pressures either. For example, in times of market stress there will be 
extraordinary meetings in order to agree to widen the bid-offer spread as a way of protecting the 
dealers against increased volatility, or to decrease mandatory trading volumes for a while. The system 
certainly contributes towards a liquidity guarantee, as one central banker explains: 
 
It allows you to go to the investors and say: ‘There is a calendar and there is always someone 
there if you want to buy or sell.’ It is all about being extremely predictable … in order to 
reassure the investors that come to see you. The fear of the investor is to not be able to resell.  
 
 
The term ‘predictable’ is key here – it is the opposite of ‘risk’. Guaranteeing liquidity means 
removing risk, and removing risk means guaranteeing liquidity. In the perfect scenario, prices on 
government bonds fall to the absolute market minimum, corresponding to zero risk. The power 
of states to shape the qualities of their debt in financial markets (its liquidity, risk profile, and 
price) is quite striking upon closer inspection, even if it is not perfect or, rather, paradoxical.  
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Speaking of the unexpected and indeed very puzzling phenomenon of negative interest rates 
on some government bonds in the wake of the financial and economic crisis, one central banker 
from a monetary policy back-office explains: 
 
Today, for example, in Germany and France [the price of government debt] of less than one 
year … is negative, you pay to have the debt. For the state that is pretty interesting, after all. 
… I was with the government debt office at the time [when interest rates turned negative] – 
we were really surprised by the negative rates, we did not understand it. … We even called 
the primary dealers to ask if it was not a mistake! I do not see the economic interest in doing 
that. … The only reason I can find is the solvency ratios [i.e., regulation of the ‘safe asset’ 
buffers that banks must hold] because there is not that much high-quality debt around. So 
you buy it to not be penalised. 
 
The so-called ‘flight to quality’ where banks prefer to lend to the German state at low rates of interest 
over lending to the Greek state at high interest rates at a substantial default risk does not in itself 
explain why they do not simply hold cash instead of taking on negative interest rates. The interviewee 
suggests that regulation imposed by the governments themselves has the power to push the price of 
government debt below zero under certain circumstances, such as those we have been witnessing 
recently in Europe.  
My claim here is that – despite the obvious differences separating them – both states and global 
custodians can be called ‘sovereigns’, not in the sense of controlling means of violence external to 
the market, but in a sense implicit to the market itself. The efficient market is ideally perfectly liquid, 
but where is that liquidity guarantee going to come from? Only agents who ‘encompass’ the market 
– either as ‘regulators’ or as ‘monopolies’ – can provide it. Yet, their guarantee will never be perfect 
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because they will simultaneously have to be in the market themselves, that is, dependent on the 
fluctuating valuations resulting from competitive transactions. The paradox of ‘sovereignty’, in this 
sense, is thus just a variation over that of ‘liquidity’. These paradoxes manifest themselves as 
practical problems of velocity, security, liquidity, and sovereignty. Market agents mobilize economic 
theories – among other instruments – in their attempts to respond to those problems.  
 
7. Collateral sovereignty and economic theory 
Following the thread of problems from the ‘Collateral is the New Cash’ report over EU capital market 
integration, triparty repo systems and, finally, sovereignty in finance has not been a drifting astray 
from the initial inquiry. Looking closely at the latter topics, we recover problems of classic economic 
theory concerning the relationship between quantity and liquidity, but in new variants.  
To begin with, note that the primary dealer system and the role of the state in guaranteeing the 
liquidity of its debt (and hence the function of that debt as collateral) resembles strikingly Georg 
Knapp’s ‘state theory of money’. Knapp conceptualized money not as the most liquid asset emerging 
from commodity exchange, but as based on a circuit of (a) the state issuing debt certificates in order 
to be able to make purchases in the market and (b) levying taxes in those very certificates (backed by 
state force against tax evaders) so as to create a general demand for them, hence (c) effectively 
imposing its debt as a medium of exchange (money) in the economy. In a more complex and less 
obvious way, states today govern the circulation, demand, and price of its own debt. Today, that debt 
has been divided between that of the central bank (cash) and that of the Treasury (government bonds, 
collateral), but the state is deeply involved in guaranteeing the exchangeability of the two in the 
market as well as their liquidity. Keynes’ central argument – that the government can indebt itself in 
times of slump to create purchasing power and thereby expand economic activity – owes much to 
Knapp, as his argument relied on the state as the guarantor of ideally infinite credit liquidity. 
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However, it would be a mistake to simply proclaim Knapp (or modern versions of it, see 
Sgambati, 2016) the ‘true’ economic theory of contemporary finance. Rather, the intrinsic 
contradiction of sovereignty, being both dependent on the market and sovereign over it, is reflected 
in the opposing economic theories on the topic – Knapp’s theory occupying just one position within 
that opposition. Monetarist theory was originally targeted against precisely the role of the state as 
sovereign in finance, but without escaping the fundamental problem. With its privileged capacity to 
create the money asset, Friedman and others argued, the state could abuse of this power and produce 
an even graver crisis than liquidity dry-up: inflation. Ultimately, in their view, money is a product of 
market exchange and any sovereign interventions (including monopoly formations) in the market will 
only impede efficiency in the long run. Fisher argued that while individuals can decide to indebt 
themselves, ‘[s]ociety as a whole cannot borrow or lend as an individual can,’ but is constrained by 
the total supply of ‘loanable funds’, asserting that ‘Society is like Robinson Crusoe picking and eating 
his berries’ (Fisher, 2012: 500–501).  
The problem should not be reduced to a binary opposition between Keynesianism and 
monetarism. Rather, the problem is dynamic in its complexity and allows for alternative positions to 
be formulated. One such alternative formulation points toward modern finance and the economic 
theories about it. The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) – first developed by Sharpe based on the 
work of Markowitz and Tobin in the second half of the twentieth century and soon to become a 
cornerstone of modern finance theory –  theorises a situation of perfect liquidity in a market without 
a sovereign body (MacKenzie, 2006; Mehrling, 2012). In CAPM there is an exogenously given 
supply of securities of which, in equilibrium, ‘everyone holds the market portfolio and adjusts risk 
exposure by borrowing or lending at the risk-free rate [of interest]’ (Mehrling, 2012: 204). A situation, 
it is worth noting, resembling the perfectly liquid trading not in qualitatively different individual 
assets, but in baskets of assets with different risk profiles within the triparty system. In the CAPM 
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world, ‘The optimal set of risky investments [is] simply the market itself’ (MacKenzie, 2006: 56). 
CAPM thus takes a first step in a new direction where the quantities that count are not only those of 
commodities, capital and money, but also the ‘quantity of risk’ (Mehrling, 2012: 105). But CAPM 
maintains some traditional aspects of the Keynes-Monetarism debate because the quantity of risk is 
assessed based on an assumption of unrestrained access to credit at the ‘riskless rate of interest,’ 
corresponding to a zero-risk investment, proxied by US short-term government bonds (Treasury Bills) 
(Mehrling, 2012: 107, 115). In other words, while seemingly assuming a world without a sovereign, 
CAPM relies on one nonetheless – one that creates both infinite money and riskless financial assets.  
Fischer Black, the mastermind of what Mehrling (2012) calls ‘the revolutionary idea of finance,’ 
pushed CAPM further (for example, by abandoning the need for a riskless asset and free credit, see 
Mehrling, 2012: 115), moving modern finance theory further away from academic economics. Black 
worked with Robert Merton and Myron Scholes on the theory of option valuation, but died too soon 
to receive the ‘Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel’ (often 
erroneously called the Nobel Prize in economics, which does not exist) along with them in 1997. 
Black also worked as an intellectual and theoretician of finance at the margins of academia, for 
example, while employed at Goldman Sachs. Many of his unpublished and ignored papers have been 
(re-)published and received thorough attention only after his death in 1995 (Black, 2009 [1987], 
2010a [1995]; Mehrling, 2012 [2005]). In one unpublished, but lucid note on the ‘fundamentals of 
liquidity,’ Black (1970) provides an early vision of what would later become the bread and butter of 
modern finance. Here, Black claims that there is no reason why the liquidity of an asset should 
influence its expected return. Ordinary economic logic would have that if an asset cannot easily be 
re-sold, it is riskier and hence should carry a higher return to compensate for that risk (cf. section 6). 
There may presently be ‘institutional constraints’ actually causing one or another trade-off between 
liquidity and return, Black suggests, but lack of liquidity can always be circumvented in the following 
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way: Because a seller can provide the buyer with credit for the sale, or borrow from the buyer in 
advance of the sale, there is ‘virtually no relationship between the legal transaction’ of a sale and ‘the 
settlement of the transaction in the form of one or more cash flows’ (Black, 1970: 3). In other words, 
both the buyer and the seller can organize their cash flows to occur conveniently and without relation 
to the time of the sale (Black, 1970: 3). More fundamentally, this means that the two functions of 
financial assets (according to Black), store of wealth and transfer of risk, ‘are separable’ (Black, 1970: 
4).  
Thus a long term corporate bond could actually be sold to three separate persons. One would 
supply the money for the bond; one would bear the interest rate risk; and one would bear the 
risk of default. The last two would not have to put up any capital for the bonds, although they 
might have to post some sort of collateral. (Black, 1970: 5). 
 
This intuition developed into what Mehrling et al. (2015: 83) describe the situation of modern 
international finance where securities can be hedged, generically speaking, by three types of ‘swaps’ 
controlling the risks of credit default, interest rate volatility, and foreign exchange volatility, 
respectively, ‘so that the combined … [investor] asset position is essentially riskfree.’  
Black’s addition that those who bear interest rate and default risk ‘might have to post some sort 
of collateral’ is crucial here because two key lessons from the 2008 financial crisis were that 
uncollateralized lending and intransparent repo chains created systemic risk in this system. Indeed, 
these lessons motivated the regulation that entailed the discussion about collateral shortages and the 
quantity theory of collateral, as we have seen. So collateral takes the centre stage in the Blackian 
world of modern finance.  
Black’s world is one of generalized sovereignty in the sense that there is no sovereign body 
(states) or bodies (such as custodian banks), since every individual is a sovereign capable of 
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separating risk and liquidity through what has become known as swap and derivatives contracts (in 
practice, such contracts are far too complex and expensive for ordinary individuals to engage in, but 
this does not seem to concern Black). Black reverses economic theory and the debate between 
Keynesians and Monetarists fundamentally by not moving from a world of commodities to a problem 
of sovereignty, but (as the true libertarian that he was) from the sovereignty of the individual to 
commodities that turn out to be nothing but different risk profiles, at least from a financial perspective. 
The problems of the state and of liquidity seemingly disappear because individuals can now create 
their own liquidity at will: credit is always an option. Except ‘they might have to post some sort of 
collateral,’ and so collateral must be not only perfectly liquid in the traditional sense but also actually 
perform the function of perfect risk transfer.  
Crucially, Black’s conception of equilibrium here is different from the neo-classical one where 
it is the (long-term) situation of stable prices in a market and the optimal equilibrium results from a 
situation with no ‘frictions’ to competition and transactions (see Arrow and Debreu, 1954). For Black, 
equilibrium is a situation where there are ‘no opportunities to make abnormal profits’ (Black, 2010b 
[1987]: xxi). Yet, the underlying problem is the same as in economic theory, albeit reversed: the 
relationship between commodities, liquidity and the ‘sovereign’ function of making commodities 
liquid. Black transposed the problem onto a new level, that of risk, but did not eliminate it. The 
Blackian world ideally requires unlimited access to a collateral asset that can immediately be 
transferred (where other assets may be less liquid) and perform the function of eliminating risk (while 
all financial assets are per definition risky). T2S, the primary dealer systems, collateral re-use and the 
triparty systems can all be seen as different responses to this problem. None of them are perfect, of 
course, but the specific flaws of the systems are not the primary interest here.  
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8. Conclusion: ‘It Depends on What you Mean by “Cash”’ 
The article set out to study the ways in which financial practitioners epistemically deal with recent 
changes in the role of collateral in contemporary finance. Specifically, I asked why and how otherwise 
abandoned quantity theory has re-emerged as an explanatory model in the field. I have argued that 
the re-emergence reflects the inherently contradictory character of liquidity in contemporary finance 
and the great shift towards scarcity and risk following the 2008 crisis. On the one hand, liquidity 
denotes the exchangeability of a single asset in bilateral trade; on the other hand, it denotes the 
integration of the market as a whole. From the first perspective, a scarce commodity can assume the 
function of a medium of exchange, that is, money. From the latter perspective, a liquidity guarantee 
is required, presupposing the existence of a ‘sovereign’ agent in the market that creates a frictionless 
space for transactions with infinite fungibility of assets and cash (credit). The contradiction of 
liquidity used to be associated primarily with money, but has become related to collateral because 
credit creation in Europe today is almost synonymous with collateralization. The slogan ‘collateral is 
the new cash’ and its rooting in quantity theory must be understood on this background. Moreover, 
the slogan exemplifies how the epistemic problem emerges in financial market practices and becomes 
visible through practitioners’ mobilization and formulation of economic theory in their attempt to 
respond to practical problems of buttressing liquidity, velocity and security.  
Tellingly of the contradictory character of liquidity, when confronted with the slogan ‘collateral 
is the new cash’, one central banker was first puzzled, but then he settled: ‘Well, it depends on what 
you mean by “cash,” but it is true, yes’. This does not mean that quantity theory is to be elevated to 
the ‘true’ representation of contemporary finance. Rather, it re-emerges as one response to the 
contradiction and problem of liquidity – a response that tackles the commodity aspect of a finite 
quantity, which has moved to the fore since 2008. A correct description of the problem of liquidity is 
only captured by economic theory in the opposition of quantity theory to competing theories 
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(responses) based on the perfect liquidity of frictionless credit. The interesting thing here about these 
opposing economic theories is that they – not as individual ‘true’ or ‘false’ theories, but in their very 
opposition – neatly capture the contradiction between a finite quantity of a risky commodity (money, 
credit, or collateral) and an infinitely liquid and riskless medium of exchange (guaranteed by a 
‘sovereign’). The paradox is that, both in the case of triparty system and of states what unleashes 
liquidity also curbs and contains it within, thereby defining the limit outside which it becomes a scarce 
commodity, that is, the ‘survival constraint’ (Mehrling, 2013). It is this contradiction that economic 
theory seems not to have been able to get hold of – perhaps due to its neo-positivistic creed to ‘clear 
definitions’ and ‘coherence’ strictly in terms of non-contradiction. What must be grasped is how the 
problem of liquidity is dynamically transposed across different levels of analysis: money, credit, 
collateral, risk, sovereignty. Even the very concept of ‘the market’ in economic theory seems to be 
central to the contradictory character of liquidity. On the one hand, the market is simply the place 
where commodities are exchanged; on the other hand, it is an ideal notion of a fully integrated space 
where perfect liquidity and fungibility means that exchange can happen as easily as if ‘nothing 
moves’. 
The analysis suggests a possible new research agenda concerning the relationship between 
economic theory and economic markets. Where economists have debated which of their theories is 
correct, sociologists have traditionally argued that economic theory is simply a wrong depiction of 
socially constructed market realities. Political economists have generally (but not exclusively) tended 
towards the view that ideas and theories reflect interests, while performativity studies have argued 
that economic theory plays a co-constitutive role in the creation of markets. But the analysis presented 
here does not fit easily with any of these views. Economic theory is mobilized in financial practice in 
the attempt to respond to a number of fundamental problems, and contradicting theories continue to 
re-emerge, albeit always in new variants, in response to new situations, precisely because they cannot 
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resolve the fundamental problem. To the extent that one can speak of economic theory (both academic 
and in practice) being correct, it is so not by virtue of its theoretical propositions, but to the extent 
that opposing economic theories neatly represent the problem of ‘liquidity’ and ‘the market’ on which 
economic theory itself builds – precisely by virtue of their mutually contradictory propositions.  
 
Notes 
1 Regulation includes notably Basel-III/CRD-IV on risk-weighted assets, leverage ratios, and 
liquidity rules, EMIR requirements to over-the-counter derivatives clearing margins, AIMFD, and 
UCITS-V. 
2 For eligible assets, European central banks apply haircuts as high as 65 %, meaning that assets worth 
165 must be pledged in order to release credit worth 100. 
3 Typing slightly modified.  
4 That is, into the number of collateral pledges or repos multiplied the average credit obtained from 
the collateral. The value of the collateral must include haircuts and fees, not just the value of the credit 
line obtained (Gorton and Metrick, 2012: 428). 
5 Securities lending is also used for speculative short selling and tax-evasion purposes (‘coupon 
washing’). 
6 T2S is a special and complex, but interesting case of centralisation by the ECB, treated in detail 
elsewhere (Krarup, 2019a). 
7 This could only happen because of the constitutional ‘independence’ of European central banks 
from their national governments.  
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